Given the uncertain future of international action on climate change following the Copenhagen Accord, it appears that domestic actions within the individual signatories to the Accord will have to take the initiative on international greenhouse gas ("GHG") mitigation. Within the United States, however, such domestic efforts have not fared well legislatively, with several bills currently stuck in various stages of the legislative process.

Hannah Chang offers a way out of this impasse by focusing on the legal options available to the President for enteringinto binding International agreements without the advice and consent of the Senate. Relying on the principles  of Presidential power set forth in Justice Jackson's Youngstown opinion, the President's relevant enumerated powers, and the historical practice of executive agreements, she suggests that the President can rely on his independent foreign affairs powers, together with authority derived from existing treaties and congressional delegations, to enter into binding international  agreements that could address certain aspects of the climate change problem even as we wait for domestic climate legislation to be enacted.